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Since 2014, Turkey hosts the world’s largest refugee population, which currently stands around four million registered refugees. Although the number of non-Syrian refugees 
has risen sharply since 2010, the large majority of 
refugees are coming from Syria, ravaged by its civil 
war since 2011. Over 3.5 million Syrian refugees are 
registered in Turkey, and the actual figure could be 
much higher. While Turkey has received important 
immigration influx in the past, the scale and the pace 
of the mass arrival of Syrians is unprecedented for 
Turkey, its government, and society. Over the last 7 
years, Turkey has put in place a number of policies to 
address this challenge.
There are several discourses circulating regarding 
Turkey’s response to the influx of Syrian refugees. Many 
voices have praised Ankara not only for its resilience 
facing such an influx, but also for the open door 
policy, the quality of camps, and the positive steps 
taken toward assisting Syrians in need. Other voices, 
however, have been much more critical and have 
focused on the shortcomings of Turkey’s approach, 
highlighting the lack of full refugee status given to 
Syrians, the documented human rights violations, and 
the risks of politically instrumentalizing the situation. In 
response, Turkish officials have long complained about 
insufficient recognition of the effort accomplished and 
1 Throughout this report, we use the commonly used term of Syrian “refugees,” often referred to as such in public discussions in Turkey 
and across the world. However, it is important to note here that Syrians in Turkey are not recognized under the formal status of 
“refugees.” According to the geographical limitation of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, only individuals coming from Europe can be 
considered as “refugees” (Turkey is one of the very few countries parties to the Convention who has not lifted this limitation). Since 
2014, non-European refugees (who successfully lodge an asylum application in Turkey) are considered as “conditional refugees.” 
However, as will be detailed below, Syrians were given yet another status and are officially referred to as “individuals under Temporary 
Protection.” Official discourses also often refer to them as “guests.” But in daily discussions, Syrians are referred to as refugees or 
asylum-seekers even in Turkey.
the lack of international solidarity to assist Syrians and 
Turkey. 
This report aims at moving beyond these overly 
simplified discourses. Contradictory assessments of 
Turkey’s approach partly stem from existing differences 
between, on the one hand, the public rhetoric and 
official policies and, on the other hand, the official 
policies and their actual implementation. In addition, 
over the last 7 years, the Turkish approach has 
evolved, invalidating former truth. Similarly, it can be 
misrepresentative to talk about “a” Turkish approach 
to Syrian refugees, given that many different state 
and non-state actors, including some international 
actors, are involved in the different activities, in a 
more or less coordinated manner. Finally, from legal 
status to education, from health to work and future 
prospects, there are many different facets of Syrian 
refugee lives that are affected by how migration 
management is handled. Accordingly, this report traces 
back the different phases of the Turkish response to 
the arrival and settlement of Syrian refugees; then it 
maps the principal actors involved in Syrian refugees 
management in Turkey, and highlights the roles played 
by each; finally, the report offers some details as to how 
policies in place affect different aspects of refugees 
lives, both now and in their future, and proposes 
options to address some of the main challenges.1
In order to understand the evolution of the arrival of Syrian refugees into Turkey, and the responses proposed by the Turkish authorities, three main phases can be distinguished. While the early 
months have seen a great deal of improvisation, it laid 
the ground to the main pillars of the Turkish response: 
an open door policy and temporary protection status. 
Over the next few years, this improvised policy 
became consolidated in discourse and in law, but its 
operationalization and implementation proved more 
challenging, mostly due to the ever higher number 
of Syrian individuals entering the country. But since 
2015, while there is some consistency in the open 
and welcoming discourse of the authorities, the 
complexities of domestic and international politics 
have led to a less visible undoing of the open door 
policy, and to a hesitant transition toward a more 
long-term approach to the question.
2011: Improvisation on a welcoming, 
humanitarian approach
The first phase covers the very early months of the 
Syrian crisis when the March 2011 demonstrations 
in Syria turned to an organized and armed conflict. 
Since April 2011 a number of Syrian nationals started 
to cross the border into Turkey in order to take 
refuge. At the time, there was no strong incentive 
for the Turkish authorities to articulate a clear 
asylum policy toward these early refugees: dialogue 
was still ongoing with President Assad; the visa-
free agreement signed between Turkey and Syria 
two years earlier allowed for the easy entrance of 
Syrians; and the assumption was that the numbers 
would remain low and the duration of their stay 
limited, impending a soon-to-follow return. The 
Turkish Red Crescent provided first aid assistance 
and temporary accommodation to some of them. 
Other Syrians were able to live with acquaintances 
and on their own savings. Nevertheless, recognizing 
the uniqueness of the situation, AFAD (the Disaster 
and Emergency Management Presidency) started 
to first build refugee camps for Syrians as early as 
midsummer 2011. 
In October 2011, Turkey’s Ministry of Interior announced 
that Syrian refugees would be granted the status 
of “temporary protection” (TP). Little precision was 
offered as to what this status meant exactly, generating 
a lot of confusion over the following months, but in 
practice offered a collective, blanket and immediate 
protection in Turkey to individuals fleeing Syria. This 
also prevented them from applying to the regular 
individual asylum procedure. 
At the discursive level, after Turkey’s policy reversal 
of November 2011 on Syria, a clear discourse toward 
Syrian populations started to develop: one that 
vindicated a proactive welcome, an open border and 
open door approach, and a focus on humanitarian 
needs. For the following year or so, however, this 
policy of openness remained conditional on a 
relatively low number of refugees: as late as August 
20, 2012, the then Turkish Foreign Minister stated 
that Turkey would remain open to Syrian refugees 
until they reach the number of 100,000, implying 
that once this number is reached, there would be 
limitations put to the seemingly free entrance of 
Syrians.
This initial response to Syrian refugees was unusual 
for Turkey. Twenty years earlier, when facing the mass 
influx of Iraqi refugees, Ankara’s response had been 
more restrictive. Turkey’s openness in 2011 signaled 
an important change in Turkish approach to asylum, 
as well as its wish to set an example for the rest of 
the world. Early on indeed, Turkey refused or kept 
its distance from international help in an attempt to 
show that it could handle the situation on its own.
2012-14: Crafting a policy based on open 
door, camps, and temporary protection
By October 2012, the one-hundred thousand thresh-
old is reached, and the numbers will only increase 
exponentially in the years to come. But rather than 
changing Turkey’s openness, we only see a consolida-
tion of this discourse in policy and in practice. In this 
second phase, roughly covering the years 2012, 2013, 
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The first one is the rise and expansion of ISIS in 
territories bordering Turkey throughout 2014 and 2015. 
While Turkey intends to keep the border “open” for 
refugees, this also means that terrorists, such as Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) members, can take 
advantage of this openness.4 ISIS’ push, together with 
the awakening of the Syrian Kurdish movement, creates 
for Ankara a complicated security situation. Eventually, 
by 2016, Ankara decides to more systematically close 
the border to better control who is crossing. In practice 
it means the sealing of the border outside of border 
gates, the construction of a wall at the border (partially 
completed as of June 2018) and in January 2016, the 
4 Tim Arango and Eric Schmitt, “A Path to ISIS, Through a Porous Turkish Border,” The New York Times, March 9, 2015, https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/europe/despite-crackdown-path-to-join-isis-often-winds-through-porous-turkish-border.html.
5 Human Rights Watch, “Turkey/Syria: Border Guards Shoot, Block Fleeing Syrians,” February 3, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2018/02/03/turkey/syria-border-guards-shoot-block-fleeing-syrians.
reinstatement of visa requirements for Syrian nationals 
(coming by air or by sea). Despite all of these, the 
Turkish government sustains that Syrian nationals in 
need are still able to come into Turkey, but have to do 
so through border gates and after being scrutinized for 
security reasons by border guards. And indeed, while 
the number of Syrians have continued to increase—
most likely indicating that many Syrians can still enter 
Turkey—there are also increased reports of Syrians who 
are being pushed back at the border and unable to 
enter.5 On paper, Turkey reverted its open border policy 
but sustained its open door policy. In practice however, 
even the open door policy is applied with significant 
and 2014, there is an interesting and rather successful 
exercise of policy crafting. 
The asylum policy that emerges in this period for 
Syrian refugees relies heavily on the idea of open 
border and open door. Early on in the conflict, 
Syrians were able to enter freely into Turkey, 
whether or not they had appropriate identification, 
and whether or not they were crossing at an official 
border gate. Syrians are also guaranteed a right of 
nonrefoulement (i.e., not to be forcefully turned 
back to Syria). Nevertheless, and as early as 2012, 
occasional temporary closures of the border, or of 
specific border gates, were reported.2  
Another central feature of Turkish policy toward 
Syrian refugees during this phase is the construction 
of numerous refugee camps. By the end of 2014, 
AFAD has built 23 camps (officially called temporary 
accommodation centers), hosting 230,000 Syrian 
refugees, and providing amenities that received 
the high praise of the international community.3 
Eventually, AFAD built 26 such camps. While 
accommodation was provided in the camps, there 
was no obligation for Syrians to reside there, and 
camps residents were mostly free to move in and out 
of the camps.
At the same time, Turkey was able to capitalize on 
a new comprehensive immigration law passed in 
April 2013 (and implemented a year later): the Law 
on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP). 
The initial impetus for this new law predated the 
Syrian crisis. But the later phases of drafting would 
happen concurrently with the arrival of Syrians, 
which influenced some of the articles. In practice, it 
creates a legal basis for the TP status (alongside the 
other statuses of individual international protection: 
conventional, conditional, and subsidiary).
LFIP provides a legal grounding to the TP status, but 
it is the Temporary Protection Regulation of October 
2014 (together with the AFAD Circular on Healthcare 
and other Services for Syrians a year earlier in 
September 2013) that will clarify the content of the 
TP status for Syrians. Taking inspiration from the 
European Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/
EC), the Turkish TP status provides the following 
2 Human Rights Watch, “Iraq/Jordan/Turkey: Syrians Blocked from Fleeing War,” July 1, 2013, 
 https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/01/iraq/jordan/turkey-syrians-blocked-fleeing-war.
3 Mac McClelland, “How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp,” the New York Times, February 13, 2014, https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/02/16/magazine/how-to-build-a-perfect-refugee-camp.html.
rights and services: respect of nonrefoulement 
principle, access to health and welfare services, access 
to education, access to the labor market, and access 
to services for people with special needs.
This phase represents a climax for Turkey’s Syrian 
refugee policy. A clear, open, welcoming and 
humanitarian policy is formulated and put in place. 
Many refugees express their gratefulness of the 
rights and services offered. The Turkish population 
demonstrates a high-level of acceptance of this new 
population. And while Turkey complains that other 
countries, such as EU Member States, fall short of 
their contribution, or at least recognition of Turkey’s 
commendable efforts, many key actors of the 
international community recognize and praise Turkey’s 
approach to Syrians. With the consolidation of the 
policy toward Syrian refugees, and the accompanying 
rising cost, Ankara also opens up more to international 
actors and observers, and Ankara becomes more 
insistent in its call for more solidarity. 
This policy success, however, is predicated on the 
“temporary” stay of Syrians in Turkey, as well as on 
the stabilization of the number of Syrians in Turkey. It 
was also without taking into account the increasingly 
complicated context of Turkish foreign policy.
2015-present: Responding to the challenges 
of long-term settlement and foreign  
policy developments
Indeed, starting from the second half of 2014, a 
number of new challenges start to appear that will 
force Turkey to rethink and adapt its approach to 
Syrian refugees. These new challenges revolve around 
three main axes. 
Source: DGMM/UNHCR
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
14
,2
37
24
4
,6
5
5
1,
5
19
,2
8
6
2,
5
0
3,
5
4
9
2,
8
34
,4
4
1
3,
4
26
,7
8
6
3,
5
4
8
,2
73
*
*By August 16, 2018
Distribution of Syrian 
Refugees in the 
Scope of Temporary 
Protection by Year
“The complexities of 
domestic and international 
politics have led to a less 
visible undoing of Turkey's 
open door policy.”
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restrictions and does not always seem to be applied 
consistently. 
The second main challenge that Turkey is facing 
follows partially from the rise of ISIS and concerns 
the acceleration of the number of Syrians coming 
into Turkey. In October 2015, two million Syrian 
refugees were registered in Turkey, two-and-a-half 
million in January 2016, three million in June 2017, 
and three and half million by February 2018. In 
practice, this means two important developments: 
the existing camps can only host a very small fraction 
of Syrians living in Turkey (only 6 percent in 2018) 
with the overwhelming majority of Syrians living 
as urban refugees. Effectively, this renders Turkey’s 
camp policy, while still very important and expensive, 
quite insufficient given the size of the challenge. In 
addition, the level of frustration—if not conflict—
between the local population and Syrians increases. 
Finally, the duration of the crisis, and the lack of end in 
sight, increasingly highlights the third main challenge, 
which is the need to find a long-term, durable solution 
for Syrians. This requires moving beyond the short-
term emergency temporary assistance policy that 
had framed the Turkish approach so far. As detailed 
below, Ankara has accordingly been considering 
and mentioning the three common long-term 
solutions envisioned for refugees: voluntary returns, 
resettlement, and integration.
Facing these new and very serious challenges, the 
evolving international context has also provided 
some new opportunities for Turkey. In particular, 
the Mediterranean migration management crisis 
6 The EU-Turkey statement envisions new impetus on issues that have long been on the table: the restart of Turkey’s accession process, 
an updating of the customs union, and visa-free travel for Turkish nationals in the EU Shengen zone.
7 Al-Jazeera, “Turkey to set up refugee camps near Syria’s Idlib,” March 6, 2018, 
 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/turkey-set-refugee-camps-syria-idlib-180306093813355.html; 
 Zeynep Bilgehan, “Some 150,000 Syrians have returned from Turkey,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 1, 2018, 
 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/some-150-000-syrians-have-returned-from-turkey-131108.
of 2015-16 presented a chance for Turkey to give 
new impetus to its relationship with the EU and 
collaborate more on migration. The March 2016 EU-
Turkey Statement (aka EU-Turkey migration deal) 
presents a new orientation of Ankara’s approach to 
migration management, who accepts to help manage 
and control the EU external border, and to prevent 
Syrians (among other migrants) to move onward to 
the EU, in exchange for more financial contributions 
from the European Union (EU), as well as other 
important political gains unrelated to migration.6  It 
also sheds light on Ankara’s tendency to link Syrians 
with other foreign policy purposes, as also evident 
in the mutual influence of Ankara’s refugees policies 
and politico-military projects in Syria (in particular in 
Fall 2014, and since 2016). In the areas under Turkish 
military control in Syria (such as Jarablus, Al-Bab, 
Afrin), there are reports both of Syrian refugee 
camps set up by Turkish actors, as well as settlement 
of Syrian refugees returning to Syria from Turkey.7
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“The March 2016 EU-Turkey 
Statement presents a new 
orientation of Ankara’s 
approach to migration 
management, who accepts 
to help manage and control 
the EU external border.”
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As the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey grew, an increasing number of actors entered into the scene. A myriad of actors at different levels have provided a multi-layered response 
to the refugee situation. In this section, an overview of 
the role of actors at the local, national, international 
and nongovernmental organization (NGO) level will be 
provided in order to exemplify the range of efforts in 
addressing the refugee challenge.
Top-level political leadership: a strong 
political will
Before mentioning the operational role played by 
different institutions, it is also important to recognize 
the role played by the top-political leadership who, from 
the beginning of the crisis, have articulated a very clear 
and unambiguous discourse emphasizing the need to 
welcome Syrians. They have invested significant political 
and symbolical capital into this issue, and given the 
centralized nature of Turkish politics, this has ensured 
compliance to the welcoming policy at all levels of the 
governing party. At the same time, however, this has 
also led to a certain level of politicization of the issue, as 
this Syrian policy articulated at the top was never fully 
debated in parliament or with other political parties. 
As a result, Syrians are now closely associated with the 
government, which had led opposition parties to criticize 
the welcoming policy and to lack on their own moral 
commitment toward refugees.
National level: the central role of AFAD and 
DGMM
At the national level, two main agencies have been in 
charge of the Syrian refugee population. AFAD (tied 
to the Prime Minister’s Office until June 2018—now 
attached to the Ministry of Interior) was the main 
coordinating agency early on in the crisis, but, over 
time, has been transferring responsibilities to DGMM 
(the Directorate General for Migration Management, 
an agency attached to the Ministry of Interior). 
Kizilay, the Turkish Red Crescent, has also played an 
important role complementing AFAD and DGMM. 
Since the outbreak of the war in Syria, AFAD has 
provided different types of humanitarian aid to 
Syrians in Turkey but also within Syrian borders. But 
AFAD’s signature policy contribution has been the 
building and management of the refugee’s camps. As 
of July 2018, there are nineteen camps spread across 
ten provinces bordering Syria in southern Turkey 
which accommodate a total of 210,177 refugees. The 
camps are equipped with schools, hospitals, and 
athletic facilities and have received the praise of the 
international community for their high standards of 
quality. 
Beside the camps, the Temporary Protection Regulation 
of 2014 designated AFAD as “the coordinating agency 
in charge of the delivery of services by the relevant 
Ministries and public institutions in the fields of health 
care, education, access to labor market, social benefits 
and assistance, and interpretation.”8  According to 
Anatolia News Agency, AFAD has spent roughly 2 bil-
lion USD, with an additional half-a-billion cost for the 
depreciation of the land on which the camps are.
In the meantime, DGMM, an agency fully dedicated 
to migration was created when LFIP was adopted in 
April 2013.9  The Directorate General was conceived as 
a regular and permanent agency with the mission to 
develop, implement, and coordinate policies and strat-
egies related to migration and regulate the status of 
foreign nationals in Turkey.  
Early on, DGMM was designated as the competent 
authority to identify which foreigners are eligible 
for TP in Turkey, and whether they shall be referred 
to the camps or not, as well as to conduct refugee 
registration and documentation through its 
Provincial Departments for Migration Management 
(PDMM) established in the 81 provinces of Turkey. 
The Directorate General has collected biometric 
data, including fingerprints, during registration and 
maintained electronic files in an internal database for 
each beneficiary. 
Earlier in the crisis, a majority of the Syrian refugees 
staying outside the camps remained unregistered and 
unidentified. This situation made it easier for them to 
move freely within the country and more difficult to 
know in which province were they living in or whether 
they had moved outside of Turkey. As a result, the 
Turkish government decided to introduce controls and 
limitations on the movement of Syrians within Turkey. 
As of 2016, Syrians are required to live in the province 
they are registered: accordingly, they can only benefit 
from certain services (health, work, etc.) in that 
province. This move was also partly in response to the 
enactment of the EU-Turkey Statement, as it intended 
to prevent refugees seeking to travel to Western 
regions in order to cross from Turkey to the EU. 
As the number of refugees increased, and the 
settlement of Syrians in Turkey became a permanent 
reality, the Turkish authorities realized that the 
challenge now lies in providing a sustainable livelihood 
for refugees living outside the camps on their own 
means. Given AFAD’s focus on emergency, it became 
clear that DGMM would be a better fit to coordinate 
efforts relating to the accommodation of Syrians in 
8 Temporary Protection Regulation, National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities, October 22, 2014, Article 26 (4), accessed at: 
 http://www.refworld.org/docid/56572fd74.html.
9 Law on Foreigners and International Protection, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management, 
April 2014, Article 103, available at http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/eng_minikanun_5_son.pdf.
Turkey. Consequently, as of March 2018, the overall 
coordination and the management of the camps, as 
well as the reimbursement of refugees’ medication 
costs, have been transferred to DGMM. In the months 
to come, DGMM is expected to announce a holistic 
harmonization strategy for Syrian refugees which 
aims to address their long-term needs.
While the increasing transfer of responsibilities to 
DGMM makes sense from an institutional point of 
view, it remains a great challenge for a new agency 
who needs to establish itself in the realm of migration 
THE DIVERSE ACTORS OF A  
MULTIFACETED APPROACH
“From the beginning 
of the crisis, the top-
political leadership has 
articulated a very clear and 
unambiguous discourse 
emphasizing the need to 
welcome Syrians. They 
have invested significant 
political and symbolical 
capital into this issue, but 
this has also led to a certain 
level of politicization.”
BOX 1: Focus on the Turkish Coast Guard
Together with other border security forces, the 
Turkish Coast Guard, affiliated to the Ministry 
of Interior, has been another crucial actor in the 
management of irregular migration in coordination 
with other national authorities. In 2015, the Aegean 
Sea became the scenario of hope and tragedy, with 
more than one million migrants making their way into 
Europe through Turkey. In this context, the Turkish 
Coast Guard's mission has been to protect, prevent, 
and deter irregular migrants from undertaking a 
perilous journey which often ended up in unwanted 
fatalities, while combating the illegal smuggling 
migrant networks. 
While everyone remembers Alan Kurdi, a three-
year old Syrian, whose lifeless body washed ashore 
in the Aegean coastal town of Bodrum in 2015, it is 
less known that the Turkish Coast Guard was able 
to rescue his father. The Turkish Coast Guard in 
cooperation with the Turkish Navy has been able to 
substantially decrease the number of casualties at 
sea. 
As a result of EU-Turkey collaboration under the 
migration deal, the number of irregular migrants 
who crossed to the Aegean islands from 2015 to 2018 
experienced a sharp decrease of 97 percent. While 
there were 2,347 irregular daily crossings on average 
in 2015, the number went down to 79 in 2017 and 74 
at present. Despite these figures, more improvement 
needs to be worked on as factors encouraging some 
border crossings have not ceased to exist. Ironically, 
the Turkish Coast Guard has emphasized that some of 
FRONTEX and Greek Coast Guard operations create a 
magnet effect for migrants by reducing the distance 
to be crossed before being rescued.  
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management, create provincial departments all 
around the country, find and train appropriate staff, 
manage the regular immigration, and asylum inflows 
in Turkey, and handle the unprecedented load of 
managing the Syrian population. 
DGMM does not work alone though. Aside from 
DGMM and AFAD, many different ministries are 
involved in the overall Turkish response. Accordingly, 
in 2017, a Migration Policies Board was set up under 
the chairmanship of the Minister of Interior, in order 
to discuss policies and strategy and coordinate the 
activities of the eleven ministries involved.10 Some 
of these ministries, like the Ministries of Health, of 
Education, of Labor, Social Services, and Family, 
10 The Ministries involved are: the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, Ministry of Labor and Social Security (now combined in on 
Ministry of Labor, Social services and Family), the Ministry for European Union (now under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of 
Health, and Ministry of Transport, as well as the President of the Presidency of the Turks Abroad and Related Communities and DGMM.
have also been directly involved in addressing 
refugee needs by providing free health care services, 
educational activities, work permit and assistance 
to Syrian refugees. Other agencies attached to the 
Ministry of Interior has also been involved, such as the 
role played by the military and the Coast Guard at the 
border (see box 1).
Local level: the municipalities’ improvised role
While AFAD has focused a lot of its activities in 
the camps, and DGMM has been busy establishing 
itself and registering millions of Syrians, Turkish 
municipalities have been at the forefront of the 
refugee response. They have been providing all 
kinds of assistance to refugees and worked with local 
organizations in order to address the most pressing 
needs of the new Syrian residents. 
However, municipalities have often had to act 
outside the limits of their responsibilities, as their 
role lacks legal backing. No reference is made to 
municipalities in LFIP except for article 96 where 
coordination with local authorities on harmonization 
policies is envisioned. As a result, municipalities have 
lacked adequate funding. More than half of the 
municipalities’ budget comes from national transfers, 
which are calculated according to the population 
of the municipality and its gross domestic product 
(GDP). Yet foreign residents—i.e., Syrian refugees—are 
not counted in the population total. This is particularly 
problematic for those municipalities that host large 
number of refugees.
While 94 percent of refugees live outside of camps, 
they are not evenly distributed across the territory 
and tend to be concentrated in border regions, as 
well as wealthy and prosperous cities like Istanbul. 
The cities hosting the highest population of Syrians 
are: Istanbul (563,874, the equivalent of 4% of the 
A Turkish Coast Guard official during a rescue operation in the Aegean Sea. Credit: Turkish Coast Guard Command
Distribution of Syrian Refugees in the Scope of  
Temporary Protection by Top Ten Province
ISTANBUL
563,874
İZMIR
138,330
BURSA
151,943
ADANA
221,325 GAZIANTEP
390,860
ŞANLIURFA
470,827
HATAY
442,357
KILIS
130,448
MARDIN
91,955
MERSIN
208,587
MINMAX
Source: Directorate General of Migration Management
*Data from August 2018
“Municipalities have 
been providing all 
kinds of assistance to 
Syrian refugees and 
they often had to act 
outside the limits of 
their responsibilities.”
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population), Şanlıurfa (470,827, 24%), Hatay (442.357, 
28%), Gaziantep (390,860, 19%), Mersin (208,587, 
12%), Adana (221,325, 10%), Bursa (151,943, 5%), 
Kilis (130,448, 96%), Izmir (138,330, 3%) and Mardin 
(91,955, 11%). In some of these cities, the percent-
age of refugees equals or exceeds 20 percent of the 
total population, like the case of Şanlıurfa, Hatay, and 
Gaziantep. An extreme case is Kilis, where the refugee 
population roughly equals the local population. 
While the services provided by the different munici-
palities—ranging from providing first-need goods to 
legal counseling services—have been similar in na-
ture, some are more advanced in their institutional 
capacity than others. Gaziantep (see box 2), Şanlıurfa, 
and Adana, have established a migration directorate 
within the municipality in order to coordinate and 
better manage all the refugee-related actions and ini-
tiatives. Similarly, Sultanbeyli district in Istanbul has 
created its own registration system and established an 
NGO in order to be able to apply for funds. But while 
a lot of attention is put on these more visible munici-
palities, others are facing difficulties in addressing the 
settlement of Syrians. 
Among the enduring challenges identified by munici-
palities are the need for more accommodation and in-
frastructure facilities, especially relating to education 
and health, as well as water and waste management. 
Hence the crucial importance of providing municipali-
ties with adequate resources in order to address these 
challenges.
NGOs and international organizations: filling 
the gap?
During the early years of the crisis, Turkey chose to 
manage the inflow of refugees by its own means 
without asking for help from international organizations 
or NGOs, as the government believed the crisis would 
not last long. The United Nations High Commissariat 
for Refugees (UNHCR), followed by other UN agencies, 
were only granted access to the camps in 2012 and in 
early 2014 their activities were still limited to providing 
technical support. Aside from the Turkish Red Crescent 
which was responsible for providing shelter and food 
under the coordination of AFAD, the first Turkish NGO 
able to obtain access to the refugee camps was the 
Humanitarian Aid Foundation (IHH).
However, as the number of refugees became bigger, 
Turkey realized it could not handle the situation on 
its own. The United Nations was the first to offer help 
and has become one of the most active partners in 
contributing to the Turkish response to refugees 
since 2015, through its different agencies, such as the 
UNHCR, the United Nations International Children 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the World Food Program (WFP), 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the 
International Labor Organization  (ILO), etc. 
The refugee situation has equally attracted an 
increasing number of national and international NGOs 
wishing to work in Turkey and provide assistance 
to refugees. There is however a lack of information 
among the Turkish authorities about the number of 
NGOs present in Turkey and the specific activities they 
are engaged in. In the border province of Gaziantep 
alone there were approximately 150 NGOs operating 
in 2015, including international ones. This number is 
not believed to have substantially changed in the last 
three years. 
International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) 
have tried to fill the gap left by government institutions 
and international organizations in providing aid to 
refugees living mainly outside the camps. Some 
NGOs have however cited difficulty when registering 
and obtaining residence and work permits for 
foreign workers. There have been reported cases of 
wrongdoing involving (I)NGOs which have resulted 
in administrative fines for failing to comply with the 
Turkish legislation on work permits of foreigners and 
social security. In more extreme cases, some (I)NGOs 
Source: Anatolian News Agency https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/info/infografik/8044
Turkey’s Estimated Spending on Syrian Refugees since 2012
Translation of spending from Turkish authorities (as of December 2017) 
BOX 2: Focus on Gaziantep municipality
• Gaziantep is the fourth city in Turkey hosting the 
largest number of refugees. With a population of 
over two million people, Gaziantep hosts 390,860 
refugees representing 19% of its host community. 
Only 22,482 of them live in the camps located 
within Gaziantep’s province.
• The early realization that the Syrian refugee influx 
was not a short-term but a permanent situation has 
constituted the basis of Gaziantep's comprehensive 
refugee policy developed over the years. 
• Under the mayor's vision, Gaziantep Metropolitan 
Municipality has not only provided the same public 
services to refugees as to the host community but 
it has also developed a model based on a peaceful 
coexistence between the two in order to avoid 
isolation and radicalisation. 
• Gaziantep has been the first to establish a migration 
directorate within the municipality structure 
and has also created new institutions in order to 
respond to the increased needs of refugees. Some 
of these include Temporary Education Centers, 
vocational training facilities, women shelters and a 
municipal hospital. 
• All these efforts have required an investment 
of 36 million USD, while UN Agencies have 
contributed with 8 million more. Gaziantep’s case 
not only constitutes an example to other Turkish 
municipalities but also to other countries as a 
successful model for refugee integration from a 
local perspective. 
• Other municipalities that are often seen as models 
of local refugee policies are Urfa, Adana and 
Sultanbeyli (in Istanbul). These municipalities have 
been able to gain substantial support from funding 
agencies, while others are been left on the sideline.
$30,285,573,000 USD
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have been closed due to irregularities in their statute 
or as a result of emergency decrees.  While the 
number of (I)NGOs working with Syrians increased 
until 2015, the number started to decrease again since 
2016.11 
The EU and FRiT: a late but needed help
Among international donors, the European Union plays 
a central role. In 2015, the European Union agreed to 
step up its financial engagement to support Turkey in 
its efforts to host refugees. The EU has since become 
the largest contributor to Turkey, mostly through the 
Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT). But Turkey has 
also received contributions from the European Civil 
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), 
Germany, the United States, KfW Development Bank, 
Japan, Norway, Canada, Qatar, Sweden, etc.
As part of the EU-Turkey Statement, FRiT became the 
coordination mechanism to financially assist Syrian 
refugees living in Turkey. The Facility is endowed 
with 6 billion EUR split in two installments. The 
first installment has been fully contracted with 72 
projects signed and nearly 2 billion EUR disbursed. 
The remaining 1 billion EUR will be paid in 2021, once 
the last project is completed. At the end of June 2018, 
the second tranche of 3 billion EUR of the Facility was 
approved. 
The projects financed through the Facility address 
the urgent needs of refugees and host communities 
in Turkey. These projects range from construction of 
schools and hospitals to the payment of teachers’ 
salaries. The flagship program has been the 
Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), a program 
launched in November 2016 by the WFP, the Turkish 
Red Crescent, and the Ministry of Family and Social 
Policies, under the coordination of AFAD, which has 
11 Ryby Mellen, Colum Lynch, “Inside Turkey’s NGO purge”, Foreign Policy, August 3, 2017, 
 https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/03/inside-turkeys-ngo-purge/.
12 For an overall allocation of the projects funded by the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey as of June 4, 2018 see: 
 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/facility_table.pdf.
13 “Suriyeliler için harcanan maliyetin analizi”, Anadolu Agency, December 6, 2017, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/info/infografik/8044.
14 As of September 2017, the United States announced it had spent $572,000 in Turkey as part of its humanitarian assistance in response 
to the Syrian crisis, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/09/274360.htm.
provided monthly direct cash transfers (120 TL per 
family member, about 25 USD) through debit cards 
to 1.3 million refugees out of employment to address 
their everyday needs.
Refugee families receive an additional bimonthly cash 
transfer in exchange for sending their children to 
school. This program is implemented through a close 
partnership between the Ministry of Family and Social 
Policies, the Ministry of National Education, AFAD, the 
Red Crescent, and UNICEF and had reached 360,000 
refugee children by August 2018. 
Given the long-term nature of the refugee situation 
and the need for more development assistance, 
investments under the second tranche of the Facility 
will focus more on inclusion and self-resilience. The 
priority will be put on helping to foster social cohesion 
between the refugees and the host communities in 
Turkey and increasing the employment opportunities 
of refugees. The second tranche of the Facility will be 
the last and its implementation will end in 2025. The 
European Commission has already started to work 
with the Turkish authorities in order to guarantee the 
sustainability of the interventions after the phasing 
out of the Facility.12  
All in all, a great number of actors have been involved 
in managing the Syrian refugee crisis. It is hard to 
assess the amount of effort that has been put into 
it. From a financial point of view, Turkish authorities 
estimate that Turkey has spent 31 billion USD for 
refugees in the last seven years. This number would 
include the cost of camps, public order, health 
and education services, but also the spending of 
municipalities, Turkish NGOs, and Turkish individuals’ 
contribution.13 The 6 billion EUR committed by the 
EU, and the 600,000 USD spending from the US14 
estimate, pale in comparison to the Turkish numbers.
Temporary protection status:
The legal status of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a source of constant debate. When the first Syrian refugees arrived in 2011, Turkey chose to refer to them as “guests.” At 
the time, the common belief was that the situation 
would be a temporary one and that the number of 
arrivals would not steadily increase. 
This initial assumption was quickly challenged as 
the war in Syria did not show signs of appeasement 
and more and more people were forced to leave the 
country. LFIP was the government’s response to 
provide a comprehensive legal framework for asylum 
in Turkey. The law already set the ground to create 
a TP status for Syrians, which was enshrined in a 
directive in October 2014. 
Turkey is a signatory of the Geneva Convention on 
refugees dating from 1951. The controversy, however, 
lies in the fact that it maintains a geographical 
limitation that excludes from protection anyone not 
originating from a European country.15  
Until now, the Turkish government has been reluctant 
to lift the geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. Ankara has stated that it would only 
lift it after becoming a member of the EU. However, 
under TP, Syrians enjoy many of the same rights as 
those with refugee status with the only exceptions 
of being able to work without a work permit and 
being able to obtain citizenship after a stipulated 
time frame. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the TP 
framework is conceived as a temporary measure, it 
does not have a maximum time limit. By law however, 
the application of TP can be receded of a simple 
decision by the executive branch. 
15 This is particularly significant when taking into account that one of the key implicit assumptions of the returns to Turkey under the 
EU-Turkey Statement is that Turkey can be considered a safe third country. However, according to EU law, a third country can only 
be considered safe if it has ratified the provisions of the Geneva Convention without any geographical limitations, as stipulated in the 
Directive 2013/32/EU of June 26, 2013, on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (article 39 2(a)).
16 “Turkey stops registering Syrian asylum seekers”, Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2018,  
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/16/turkey-stops-registering-syrian-asylum-seekers.
Syrians under TP are granted a legal stay in Turkey 
and are protected against nonrefoulement. With 
this status they can also enjoy free access to health, 
education, social aid, and translation services, as 
well as access to the labor market. In order to be 
able to enjoy these rights, Syrians need to obtain 
a Temporary Protection Identification Document 
issued by the PDMM which attests that the person 
concerned is a beneficiary of TP. 
While most of the barriers to registration have been 
eased over the years, there are still unregistered Syrians 
living in Turkey. Some have been reluctant to register 
as they thought that it might lower their chances to 
move to Europe or eventually going back to Syria. 
Those unregistered refugees are therefore not able to 
access the services and benefits offered by the Turkish 
state. Something similar happens to those refugees who 
register in the province they first arrive in and decide 
to move to a different part of the country later on. 
Syrians can move outside their province of residence 
for no more than 90 days upon receiving authorization. 
However, if they decide to not return, they will have to 
register again in the new province, otherwise they would 
lose their rights. In many cases, they do not apply again 
and become unprotected and vulnerable. A situation 
which, at the same time, makes it more difficult to know 
who is living where and planning for the provision of 
services to the people in need.  
On the other hand, due to the high concentration 
of refugees in urban centers, some provinces have 
reportedly suspended registration, with exceptions 
being made for newborn children and medical cases, 
as this is putting their public services under strain.16 
The fact that the refugee population is increasingly 
concentrated in a few cities has become a challenge 
that needs urgent attention at all levels. 
SYRIANS’ LIVES IN TURKEY: THE 
TEMPORARY PROTECTION REGIME
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Access to health care:
 
All Syrians under TP in Turkey are eligible to receive the 
same health care as Turkish citizens, being covered by 
the national health insurance scheme. Emergency 
medical services are also provided to nonregistered 
persons. 
Syrians have the right to access free of charge health 
care services provided by public health institutions, 
for both primary and secondary care. As subsidy of 
80 percent applies to medication costs, which used 
to be covered by AFAD but are covered by DGMM 
since March 2018.
Other than primary health care services and public 
hospitals, Syrians can also approach one of five-
hundred seventy Migrant Health Centers, usually 
located in the provinces with high refugee population 
density. These centers are staffed by both Syrian 
doctors and nurses, as well as bilingual (Turkish-Arabic) 
Turkish medical staff. Through the Facility, the EU is 
financing the establishment, furniture and operating 
costs of many of these centers. As of May 2018, 1.515 
medical staff (75 percent being Syrian refugees, 
16 percent Turkish citizen Syrians) are delivering 
primary health care services in the one-hundred and 
sixty-nine Migrant health centers supported by the 
project.
Syrians under TP can also benefit from mental health 
services provided by public health care institutions. 
More than 124,000 refugees have received support 
and treatments in this area delivered through 
various partners. Several NGOs are also offering 
mental health and psychological support in different 
locations around Turkey. In 2017, the first Community 
Mental Health Centre was opened by the Ministry of 
Health, with funding coming from the Facility. Nine 
more centers are expected to open in the near future. 
Nevertheless, two major obstacles remain when 
guaranteeing a full access to health care for 
Syrian refugees: the language barrier and the high 
mobility of refugee population. In most health care 
facilities interpreters are not available, rendering 
communication with health care providers very 
difficult. Some NGOs, including the Turkish Red 
Crescent, are trying to cover this gap. On the other 
hand, access to health care services is only possible 
17 Another side of the story. A market assessment of Syrian SMEs in Turkey, Syrian Economic Forum, June 2017,  
http://buildingmarkets.org/sites/default/files/pdm_reports/another_side_to_the_story_a_market_assessment_of_syrian_smes_in_
turkey.pdf.
in the province where Syrians are registered. 
Therefore, they risk losing this right if they decide 
to move elsewhere. The only exception is when a 
person needing a specific treatment is referred to 
another province because it is not available in the 
province of registration. 
Access to labor market:
Syrian refugees are entitled to apply for a work 
permit following a regulation passed in January 
2016. In 2018, the number of work permits granted to 
Syrians under TP is around 25,000. This represents 
a very small fraction of the more than 1.5 million 
Syrian refugees between the age of 19 and 64 who 
are part of the labor force in Turkey. There are two 
main reasons for this low number. On the one hand, 
employers do not have enough incentives to hire 
Syrians in the formal labor market and prefer to hire 
them informally to evade taxes and social security 
payments. On the other hand, Syrians are wary of 
accepting formal contracts of employment as it 
would disentitle them from claiming state benefits. 
There is, in this regard, a general disincentive on both 
sides to settle formalities. To remedy this issue, the 
government is putting in place some measures such 
as reducing the work permit fee from 600 to 250 
Turkish liras (US$52) in order to promote refugee 
employment but more incentives are needed to 
mitigate this problem. Encouraging Syrian refugees 
to move to the formal economy is also important 
to reduce perceptions of unfair competition, in an 
economy where the unemployment rate among 
Turkish citizens is around 10%.
While in some cases Syrians are considered as 
competitors for jobs, they have also proved their 
entrepreneurial flair by starting economic activities 
that are improving their own livelihoods and that 
of others. According to the Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), “Syrians 
have invested nearly $334 million into 6,033 new 
formal companies since 2011 and they rank number 
one among foreign founders of new companies 
each year since 2013.”17 It is estimated that Syrian 
investments in Turkey are around 463,000 USD.
Another challenge that needs to be urgently 
addressed is the phenomenon of child labor, which 
does not only involve Syrians but also Turkish 
children, although on a different scale. In response 
to this, the government declared 2018 as the year of 
the fight against child labor in Turkey accompanied 
by a comprehensive National Action Plan to prevent 
this phenomenon.18 Another important issue relates 
to the situation of seasonal and agricultural workers. 
While work permit requirements can be exempted 
for such work, most refugees remain employed 
informally and represent a vulnerable subclass 
among Syrian refugees. While most attention 
recently has been given to urban refugees, Syrians 
working in the agricultural sector should not be 
overlooked. 
Facilitating access to the labor market by removing 
existing barriers is crucial for the integration of 
Syrians into society and guaranteeing a sustainable 
livelihood for them and their families. Encouraging 
the process to start a business in Turkey, as well as 
18 Nikolaj Nielsen, “EU and Turkey fight for ‘lost generation’, EU Observer, June 4, 2018, https://euobserver.com/foreign/141971.
easing the investment environment can be a way of 
expanding employment opportunities for refugees. 
Access to education:
Turkey’s approach to the education of Syrian 
refugee children provides the best evidence yet 
that Ankara is serious about facilitating the long-
term settlement of Syrians in Turkey. Education 
indeed remains one of the greatest challenges for 
refugee populations, with the risk of creating a “lost 
generation” with long-term negative effects. In 
Turkey, there are close to one million Syrian school 
age children.
Since the beginning of the crisis, a dual education 
system was put in place: on the one hand, Ankara 
opened access to Turkish public schools to all 
Syrians, who then follow the Turkish curriculum; 
on the other hand, since September 2014, Ankara 
Syrians have started new businesses in Turkey ranging from restaurants and repairing shops to haberdashery and clothes shops.  
Credit: Umut Uras / Al Jazeera
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started to establish (or recognized informally 
existing) Temporary Education Centers (TECs), 
which follow a modified Syrian curriculum taught in 
Arabic with a majority of Syrian teachers. Initially, 
the TECs were much more popular among Syrian 
students than Turkish public schools. 
This system significantly increased the rate of 
enrollment: in 2014, roughly 30 percent of school 
age children were enrolled, while roughly 62 percent 
were enrolled as of 2018 (including primary school 
enrollment rate close to 100 percent). Ensuring the 
enrollment of the remaining 38 percent is both a 
priority and a challenge for Turkish authorities. In 2016, 
roughly 41 percent of Syrian children were enrolled in 
TECs, while 59 percent were in Turkish public schools.
Responding to concerns regarding both the uneven 
quality of education in TECs and the isolation of 
school children from the rest of Turkish society, 
Ankara decided in early 2016 to phase out TECs. This 
transition to enroll all Syrian children in Turkish public 
schools would ensure the better integration of Syrians 
into Turkish society and would officially recognize 
Syrian students’ diplomas in Turkey and beyond.
This transition is facilitated with funds from UNICEF 
and the European Commission with the goal to 
reach 100 percent enrollment of Syrian children. 
However, the fast pace of the transition and a lack of 
preparedness from public schools has led to concerns 
that the transition will increase resentment of both 
Syrian and Turkish children, teachers, and parents, 
possibly leading to a drop in the enrollment rate. In 
addition, questions are being asked regarding how 
the Turkish curriculum could be revised to better 
integrate the experience of Syrians, which reignite the 
broader questions of multiculturalism in the Turkish 
education system.
As is usual in the early response to mass refugee influx, Turkish authorities' main focus so far has been to provide temporary relief to population facing urgent needs. As Turkish 
authorities are aware, the time to move beyond short-
term solutions and think of durable ways to address 
long-term needs has long come. In practice however, 
the conceptualization and implementation of durable 
solutions proves challenging. 
The international community has long talked about 
three durable solutions to refugee situations: 
resettlement into a third country, voluntary return, and 
integration in the host country. In the case of Syrians 
in Turkey, resettlement into a third country remains 
a difficult option given an unfavorable international 
environment in both Europe and the United States 
where governments are reluctant to resettle refugees. 
Nevertheless, resettlement was one of the most 
important aspects of the EU-Turkey refugee deal signed 
in March 2016. Since then, roughly 15,000 Syrians were 
resettled from Turkey to different EU member states.19 
It is unclear how many more will be resettled given the 
voluntary nature of the scheme hereafter, and in any 
case, these figures only represent a small fraction of 
the overall Syrian population in Turkey. 
For a long time, return was not a viable option, but while 
it continues to be very challenging, the withdrawal of 
ISIS from the area, and the Turkish military incursions 
in Jarablus and Afrin, have been used as an argument 
to encourage the “return” of Syrians to Syria (even 
though the land offered to them may not be the area 
where they are from). Since 2017, AFAD has announced 
that 150,000 Syrians have permanently returned 
to Syria (in northern areas where there is a Turkish 
military presence).20  However, given the complexity of 
the Syrian conflict, it is unclear how much protection 
Syrian returnees can really benefit from, and their 
19 According to the one-to-one principle of the Turkey-EU statement, the EU should resettle in Europe one Syrian refugee for every 
irregular migrant returned to Turkey. While 1,700 migrants have been returned to Turkey, roughly 15,000 have been resettled, well 
exceeding the one-to-one principle. Nevertheless, many more refugees in Turkey should be offered resettlement as a durable solution.
20 Zeynep Bilgehan, “Some 150,000 Syrians have returned from Turkey,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 1 2018,  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/some-150-000-syrians-have-returned-from-turkey-131108.  
Another source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned that the current number (in August 2018) of Syrian returnees to Syria is 
194,514.
immediate security remain dependent on the strength 
of the Turkish military in the area at the time. 
Finally, integration seems to be the most likely option 
for a significant portion of the Syrian population. By 
definition, TP does not offer a durable solution, and 
the lack of long-term guarantee for Syrians put them 
in a limbo situation, which creates detrimental form of 
permanent precarity. The ongoing transition from the 
“Syrian” temporary education centers to Turkish public 
schools is a strong signal of Ankara’s recognition and 
willingness to accommodate Syrians' long-term stay 
in Turkey. In addition, following an announcement in 
July 2016 by the president, there has been a move to 
open a path to Turkish citizenship to some Syrians. It 
is estimated that about 57,000 Syrians have gained 
Turkish citizenship, a quarter of whom claimed 
citizenship through filiation or marriage. The majority, 
however, gained citizenship as part of an effort to 
recognize the contribution of highly educated, highly 
skilled individuals, including sportspersons and artists. 
There does not seem to be a broader policy to provide 
access to citizenship to the large majority of Syrians. 
In fact, Ankara refrains from talking about integration, 
and the official policy is still based on the assumption 
that Syrians will eventually leave Turkey. Rather, 
“By definition, temporary 
protection does not offer 
a durable solution, and the 
lack of long-term guarantee 
for Syrians put them in a 
limbo situation.”
FUTURE PROSPECTS OF SYRIAN 
REFUGEES IN TURKEY
A Syrian teacher in the classroom at a Temporary Education 
Center. Credit: Turkey PM Press & Info
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the official policy is one of “harmonization” (uyum) 
to facilitate the long-term (but still temporary) 
harmony between Syrians and Turkey’s population. A 
harmonization policy has been in the works for some 
time now.
The lack of clear durable prospects for Syrians is 
difficult not only for Syrians themselves, but also for 
the community in which they are a part of in Turkey. 
With rising numbers, the Turkish population, that has 
proved particularly welcoming and resilient so far, is 
showing clear signs of increasing frustration. Three 
main factors contribute to increased animosity: the 
political polarization over the issue of Syrian refugees 
in Turkey, the lack of clear future prospects for Syrians, 
and the lack of awareness campaigns regarding 
Syrians refugees to dispel many of the commonly held 
incorrect beliefs, as well as help the Turkish population 
prepare to live with refugees in the long-term. 
For the past 7 years, and with over 3.5 million Syrian refugees on its territory, Turkey has been faced with an unprecedented migration challenge which no country could ever be 
prepared for enough. Yet, over the years, Turkey put in 
place a number of policies, coordinated among many 
different actors, and provided a multifaceted response 
to a complex question. All of Turkey’s approach toward 
Syrian refugees cannot be understood in one single 
story, and this report proposes to present insights 
into the complexity and sometimes contradictions of 
Turkey’s response to refugees. However, looking at the 
situation today, Turkey deserves acknowledgment for 
its resilience in managing the situation with calmness 
and openness. 
Refugees across the world today face a tough 
predicament. In many developing countries, there is 
a lack of financial and organizational capacities that 
would enable to respond swiftly to refugees’ needs. 
In many developed countries, there has been recently 
a lack of political willingness to be fully welcoming 
toward refugees. Turkey is not only unique for the 
record number of Syrian refugees it has hosted, 
but also for eschewing these two pitfalls: indeed 
it has demonstrated that it has both the material 
capabilities and the political will to provide a dignified 
life to refugees. Accordingly, it is not uncommon to 
hear Syrian refugees saying that Turkey, of all other 
countries, is the best option for Syrian refugees. Some 
experts have also said that what Turkey has achieved 
in the last few years is unprecedented in the history 
of refugee movements. However, this unique and 
laudable approach should be an encouragement to do 
even more for Syrians (together with the international 
community) by paying attention to some of the 
shortcomings of existing policies. To fully become a 
model of how to welcome refugees, Ankara can remain 
proud of itself, while at the same time remain open 
to new ways of improving and addressing remaining 
difficulties. In particular, the Syrian refugee policy put in 
place in 2014-15 has been slowly dismantled over time 
(sidelining of camps, closing of the border, limitation on 
freedom of movement under TP, early returns, possible 
push backs, demographic engineering, etc.), and a new 
sense of direction needs to be put in place.
In light of this reality, Ankara could consider the 
following:
- Develop a more deliberate and operational 
strategy to address present and future needs of 
Syrians and the host community. While the principles 
of Turkey’s approach were always clearly affirmed at 
the discourse level, actors on the ground were not 
always given the means and clear direction on how 
to implement said principles. This needs also to be 
accompanied by an enhanced communication and 
coordination between the different actors involved at 
the national and local level in order to ensure a better 
response to refugees’ needs, as well as to mitigate 
tensions or problems arising from their coexistence 
with the host community. Internal and external 
oversight to ensure that the principles announced 
at the top are implemented accordingly should be 
encouraged, which includes systematic investigation 
of reports of human rights violations and irregularities.
- Engage in institution-consolidation: the transfer of 
responsibilities from AFAD to DGMM, and to a lesser 
A Syrian refugee looking over Urfa and contemplating his future. Credit: Ferdi Ferhat Özsoy, W.A.I.T (Why am I in Turkey?),  
https://whyamiinturkey.com/
“Ankara refrains 
from talking about 
integration (and 
prefer the term 
“harmonization”) and 
the official policy 
is still based on the 
assumption that 
Syrians will eventually 
leave Turkey.”
“Turkey deserves 
acknowledgment for its 
resilience in managing 
the situation with 
calmness and openness. 
Unlike other countries, 
it has demonstrated 
both financial and 
organizational 
capacities, as well as 
political will.”
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extent with the Turkish Crescent, has prevented the 
creation of expertise and effective process. Investing 
in the long run in a professional institution such as 
DGMM, with capacity-building and staff training and 
retention, will help DGMM fulfil its mandate. 
- Reassess the value of limiting Syrians’ mobility: 
while there is solid ground for wanting to manage 
the spread of Syrians on Turkish territories, the 
requirement of Syrians to live in their province of 
registration seems to lead to more Syrians becoming 
unregistered and loosing access to essential services. 
- Strengthen the mandate and means of municipal-
ities: as the actor working closely with refugees in 
their daily struggle, municipalities have a great poten-
tial, but must be given the tools (legal and financial) 
to develop local solutions to local problems and act 
accordingly and consistently with the works of other 
municipalities. A good starting point would be to take 
into account the number of Syrian refugees in the to-
tal population numbers as regards to future bud-
get allocations from the government. Integration is 
always contextual, and can best be facilitated in a 
decentralized manner at the local level.
- Craft a harmonization strategy that is proactive 
and inclusive. While the extent of the Syrian crisis 
could not be anticipated in 2011, the upcoming 
challenges of Syrians long-term stay in Turkey 
can. Proactively assisting Syrians’ incorporation in 
Turkish society should be done by consulting with 
a wide range of actors, from international, national 
and local institutions, to civil society actors, 
communities’ leaders, and Syrians themselves. 
Experiences of foreign countries with integration, 
assimilation and multi-cultural models should be 
assessed to better understand what is at stake. The 
integration of Syrian students in Turkish schools is 
a good step, but needs to be complemented with 
more training for teachers, and additions to the 
curriculum that will allow for a better acceptance of 
Syrian students. 
- Commit on a form of durable solution for Syrians 
in Turkey. Even if the overall strategy involves a 
mix batch of durable solutions (including voluntary 
returns and resettlement), there is a need for a long-
term prospect for Syrians in Turkey. While blanket 
naturalization and lifting the geographical limitation 
seem off the table (for complex reasons), other options 
include opening a path to long-term residency, or 
granting the status of subsidiary protection (ikincil 
koruma). Among other things, these two options 
provide automatic rights to work (without applying 
for work permit), which would facilitate Syrians’ 
healthy integration in the job market. 
- Further facilitate Syrians’ financial autonomy. 
Further incentives need to be offered to employers 
in order to hire more Syrians through, for example, 
wage subsidies or cash for work programs and 
to entrepreneurs in order to establish their 
own companies. Easing investment procedures 
for foreigners in Turkey would help. Becoming 
economically independent through a job is a first 
step toward participating in society.
- Focus efforts on mitigating rising tensions between 
Syrians and host community. Putting in place 
programs that promote social inclusion and peaceful 
coexistence (sports tournaments, handcrafts, 
choir, etc.), prioritizing projects that improve living 
conditions of both refugees and host society without 
discrimination, and closely monitoring existing 
tensions can all help foster positive relations between 
refugees and host communities. Such policies can 
also be useful for other vulnerable foreigners living 
in Turkey, such as non-Syrian asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants working in the informal sector. 
- Engage in public policy diplomacy at home. There 
is a need to better explain what policies are in place 
toward Syrian refugees and why, to raise awareness 
both about the positive contribution of refugees 
to Turkey’s society and economy, and about the 
collective challenge it represents, so as to make 
solidarity with refugees a societal project as much as 
a governmental one. 
In turn, the international community could: 
- Increase funding. Through the Facility for Refugees, 
the EU has been financially supporting refugees and 
the host communities in Turkey and the results it has 
delivered are very satisfactory so far. More should be 
done in order to communicate the concrete results of 
the cooperation between the EU and Turkey in this area. 
But there are also concerns regarding the sustainability 
of some programs once the EU funds run out.  More 
broadly, the international financial support received by 
Turkey continues to represent a small percentage of 
the total spent by Turkey. Therefore the international 
community should continue supporting Turkey, as well 
as the other countries bordering Syria, in order to give 
Syrians living in these countries hope for the future. 
- Streamline funding. Many of the projects funded by 
international donors (EU, US, and others) are often 
financed through a UN agency, which, in turn, work with 
an implementing partner. Ensuring that more fund go 
directly to beneficiaries, and less on operational costs, 
should be a priority. 
- Increase resettlement. On one hand, there has been 
a lack of burden-sharing among Member States of the 
European Union, but also from countries around the 
world regarding refugee resettlement. The EU-Turkey 
statement contains a clause which stipulates that a 
Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be 
activated once irregular crossings between Turkey and 
the EU have been substantially reduced, which is the 
case. However, as its name indicates, it is a voluntary 
admission plan, so Member States are not obligated to 
take in more refugees.
- Support initiatives that will encourage Turkey to 
reach the goals highlighted above.
“The Syrian refugee policy 
put in place in 2014-15 has 
been slowly dismantled 
over time (side-lining of 
camps, closing of the 
border, limitation on 
freedom of movement 
under TP, early returns, 
possible push backs, 
demographic engineering, 
etc.), and a new sense of 
direction is now needed.”
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AFAD Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
DGMM Directorate General for Migration Management
ECHO  European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ESSN Emergency Social Safety Net
EU European Union
FRiT Facility for Refugees in Turkey
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ILO International Labor Organization
IOM International Organization for Migration
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
LFIP Law on Foreigners and Temporary Protection
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
IHH Humanitarian Aid Foundation
INGO International Nongovernmental Organization
PDMM  Provincial Department for Migration Management
TEC Temporary Education Center
TOBB Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TP  Temporary Protection
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations International Children Emergency Fund
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organization
FACT SHEET ACRONYMS
Syrians with a  
work permit 
(MFA, August 2018)
Syrians who received 
a work permit in 2018
(Ministry of Labor, Social 
Services and Family)
2,224
Irregular migrants returned 
to Turkey as part of the  
EU-Turkey Statement
(European Commission, June 2018)
976,200
School-aged  
Syrians (5-18)
(Ministry of National 
Education, 2018)
603,929
Syrians enrolled in 
School
(Ministry of National 
Education, 2018)
14,998
1,621,430 (46%)
Syrians under TP  
are female
(DGMM, August 2018)
1,661,602 (48%)
Syrians under TP 
are children 
(under 18)
(DGMM, August 2018)
Syrians resettled in the 
EU as part of the EU-
Turkey Statement
(DGMM, June 2018)
3,542,250
Syrians under 
TP in Turkey
(DGMM, August 2018)
360,608
Non-Syrian  
asylum seekers
(UNHCR, June 2018)
206,403 (6%)
Syrians live 
in temporary 
accommodation centers
(DGMM, August 2018)
Syrians enrolled at 
Turkish Universities
(MFA, August 2018)
About 20,000 
50,128
About 25,000
Syrians born in Turkey
(MFA, August 2018)
Syrians who received 
Turkish citizenship
(İnsan Haklarını İnceleme 
Komisyonu, March 2018)
346,330
55,583
Syrians who 
returned to Syria 
(MFA, August 2018)
194,514
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